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Abstract—Greybox fuzzing has made impressive progress in
recent years, evolving from heuristics-based random mutation
to approaches for solving individual path constraints. However,
they have difficulty solving path constraints that involve deeply
nested conditional statements, which are common in image
and video decoders, network packet analyzers, and checksum
tools. We propose an approach for addressing this problem.
First, we identify all the control flow-dependent conditional
statements of the target conditional statement. Next, we select
the data flow-dependent conditional statements. Finally, we use
three strategies to find an input that satisfies all conditional
statements simultaneously. We implemented this approach in
a tool called Matryoshka1 and compared its effectiveness on
13 open source programs against other state-of-the-art fuzzers.
Matryoshka found significantly more unique crashes than AFL,
QSYM, and Angora. We manually classified those crashes into
41 unique new bugs, and obtained 12 CVEs. Our evaluation
also uncovered the key technique contributing to Matryoshka’s
impressive performance: it collects only the nesting constraints
that may cause the target conditional statements unreachable,
which greatly simplifies the constraints that it has to solve.
1. Introduction
Fuzzing is an automated software testing technique that
has successfully found many bugs in real-world software.
Among various categories of fuzzing techniques, coverage-
based greybox fuzzing is particularly popular, which pri-
oritizes branch exploration in order to trigger bugs within
hard to reach branches efficiently. Compared with sym-
bolic execution, gray box fuzzing avoids expensive symbolic
constraint solving and therefore can handle large, complex
programs.
AFL [2] is a rudimentary greybox fuzzer. It instruments
the program to report whether the current input has explored
new states at runtime. If the current input triggers a new
program state, then the fuzzer keeps the current input as a
seed for further mutation [35]. However, since AFL mutates
the input randomly using only crude heuristics, it is difficult
to achieve high code coverage.
1. The Matryoshka doll is a set of wooden dolls of decreasing size placed
one inside another, which signifies the deeply nested conditional statements
that our tool can fuzz.
TABLE 1: Unique crashes found by Matryoshka, AFL,
Angora, and QSYM.
Program Matryoshka AFL QSYM Angora
file 15 0 0 6
jhead 758 62 549 574
xmlwf 0 0 0 0
djpeg 0 0 0 0
readpng 0 0 0 0
nm 11 3 1 13
objdump 99 0 2 4
size 10 0 0 0
readelf 261 0 0 77
mutool 0 0 0 0
tcpdump 0 0 0 0
tiff2ps 144 22 3 66
xmllint 0 0 0 0
More recent fuzzers use program state to guide input
mutation and showed impressive performance improvements
over AFL, e.g., Vuzzer [30], Steelix [26], QSYM [40], and
Angora [13]. Take Angora for example. It uses dynamic taint
tracking to determine which input byte offsets flow into the
conditional statement guarding the target branch and then
mutates only those relevant byte offsets instead of the entire
input to reduce the search space drastically. It searches for
a solution to the path constraint by gradient descent.
However, these fuzzers face difficulties when solving
path constraints that involve nested conditional statements.
A conditional statement is nested if its appearance in the
execution path is predetermined by any other conditional
statement and the variables in these statements share com-
mon input byte offsets. When this occurs, mutating the input
bytes to satisfy an inner predicate could invalidate an outer
predicate, thus rendering the inner predicate unreachable.
This problem plagues the aforementioned fuzzers since they
fail to track control flow and data flow dependencies be-
tween conditional statements. Nested conditional statements
are commonly found in encoders and decoders for both im-
ages and videos, network packet parsers and checksum ver-
ifiers, which have a rich history of vulnerabilities. Though
concolic execution can solve nested constraints, Yun et al.
shows that concolic execution engines can exhibit over-
constraining issues, which makes it too expensive to solve
the constraints [40], especially in real-world programs.
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1 // pngrutil.c 2406
2 void png_crc_read(png_ptr, buffer, length);
3 buffer[length] = 0;
4 if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
5 return;
6 if (buffer[0] != 1 && buffer[0] != 2)
7 {
8 png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr,
9 "invalid unit");
10 return;
11 }
Figure 1: An example showing nested conditional statements
on Line 6. It is difficult to find an input that reaches the false
branch of Line 6 due to Line 4.
Figure 1 shows such an example in the program readpng.
The predicate at Line 6 is nested inside the predicate at
Line 4. 2 It is difficult for the fuzzer to find an input that
reaches the false branch of Line 6 because the input has to
satisfy the false branch of Line 4 as well. When a fuzzer tries
to mutate the predicate at Line 6, it mutates only the input
byte offsets flowing into buffer[0], but this will almost
surely cause the CRC check in png_crc_finish() to
fail and to cause Line 4 to take the true branch and return.
To evaluate whether current fuzzers have difficulty in
solving path constraints involving nested conditional state-
ments, we used Angora as a case study. We ran it on 13 open
source programs, which read structured input and therefore
likely have many nested conditional statements. Table 2
shows that on all the programs, the majority of unsolved path
constraints involve nested conditional statements. On five of
the programs, more than 90% of the unsolved constraints
involve nested conditional statement3. This suggests that
solving these constraints will improve the fuzzer’s coverage
significantly.
We design and implement an approach that allows the
fuzzer to explore deeply nested conditional statements. The
following uses the program in Figure 2 as an example. Let
the current input run the false branch of Line 8. Let the goal
of the fuzzer be to explore the true branch of Line 8.
1) Determine control flow dependency among conditional
statements. The first task is to identify all the condi-
tional statements before Line 8 on the trace that may
make Line 8 unreachable. They include Line 2, 3, and
4, because if any of them takes a different branch, then
Line 8 will be unreachable. Section 3.3 will describe
how we use intraprocedural and interprocedural post-
dominator trees to find those conditional statements.
2) Determine data flow dependency among conditional
statements. Among the conditional statements identi-
fied in the previous step, only those on Line 2 and 3
2. Although syntactically both Line 4 and Line 6 are at the same level,
Line 6 is nested inside Line 4 in the control flow graph because the true
branch of Line 4 is an immediate return.
3. Some conditional statements control flow depend by other conditional
statements, but they do not share input byte offsets
1 void foo(unsigned x, unsigned y, unsigned z) {
2 if (x < 2) {
3 if (x + y < 3) {
4 if (z == 1111) {
5 if (y == 2222) {
6 ...
7 }
8 if (y > 1) {
9 ...
10 } else {
11 ...
12 }
13 }
14 }
15 }
16 }
Figure 2: A program showing nested conditional statements
have data flow dependency with Line 8. This is because
when we mutate y on Line 8, this may change the
branch choice of Line 3 and hence making Line 8
unreachable. To avoid this problem, we must keep the
branch choice of Line 3, which may require us to
mutate both x and y, but this may change the branch
choice of Line 2. Therefore, Line 2 and 3 have data flow
dependency with Line 8. By contrast, the branch choice
of Line 4 never changes as we mutate y to explore the
true branch of Line 8, so it has no data flow dependency
with Line 8. Section 3.4 will describe how we find
those data flow dependent conditional statements.
3) Solve constraints. Finally, we need to mutate the input
to satisfy several dependent conditional statements si-
multaneously. In other words, we need to find a new
input that both reaches Line 8 and satisfies its true
branch. We propose three strategies.
• The first strategy conservatively assumes that if we
mutate any byte offset flowing into any conditional
statements that Line 8 depends on, then Line 8
will become unreachable. So this strategy avoids
mutating those byte offsets when fuzzing Line 8.4
(Section 3.5.1)
• The second strategy artificially keeps the branch
choices of all the conditional statements that Line 8
depends on when mutating the input byte offsets
that flow into Line 8. When it finds a satisfying
input, it verifies whether the program can reach
Line 8 without altering branch choices. If so, then the
fuzzer successfully solves this problem. Otherwise,
the fuzzer will backtrack on the trace to try this
strategy on Line 3 and Line 2. (Section 3.5.2)
• The last strategy tries to find a solution that satisfies
all the dependent conditional statements. It defines a
joint constraint that includes the constraint of each
dependent conditional statement. When the fuzzer
4. This strategy fails to work on this example because the fuzzer is left
with no input byte offset to mutate.
finds an input that satisfies the joint constraint, then
the input is guaranteed to satisfy the constraints in all
the dependent conditional statements. (Section 3.5.3)
Our approach assumes no special structure or property
about the program being fuzzed, such as magic bytes or
checksum functions. Instead, our general approach to solv-
ing nested conditional statements can handle those special
structures naturally.
We implemented our approach in a tool named Ma-
tryoshka and compared its effectiveness on 13 open source
programs against other state-of-the-art fuzzers. Table 1
shows that Matryoshka found significantly more unique
crashes (after deduplication by AFL’s afl-cmin -C com-
mand) than AFL, QSYM, and Angora. We manually classi-
fied those crashes into unique bugs, shown in Table 7. Ma-
tryoshka found a total of 41 unique new bugs and obtained
12 CVEs in seven of those programs. Matryoshka’s impres-
sive performance is due not only to its ability to solve nested
constraints but also to how it constructs these constraints.
Traditional symbolic execution collects the predicates in
all the conditional statements on the path. By contrast,
Matryoshka collects only the predicates that may make
the target conditional statement unreachable and data flow
dependent. Our evaluation shows that the latter accounts for
only a very small fraction of all the conditional statement
on the path, which greatly simplifies the constraints that
Matryoshka has to solve.
2. Background
2.1. Greybox Fuzzing
Greybox fuzzing is a popular program testing method
which incorporates program state monitoring with random
input mutation to great effect. One example would be AFL
(American Fuzzy Lop), which leverages program state in-
formation at runtime to guide state space exploration. AFL
also supports many mutation heuristics for efficient input
generation, including bit-flips, arithmetic operations, and
input splicing. Many greybox fuzzers are AFL-like, using
numerous techniques to improve upon AFL, such as using
hardware support for efficient program coverage tracing,
multithreading support improvements, input mutation filter-
ing through neural networks and precise branch counting.
Currently, the state-of-the-art fuzzers mainly focus on
improving fuzzing coverage efficiency through techniques
such as dynamic taint analysis, hybrid concolic execution,
and principled input mutation. They have demonstrated the
effectiveness of their respective methods in benchmarks
such as LAVA-M [14], and have found numerous bugs and
vulnerabilities in real-world programs.
2.2. Nested Conditional Statements
Coverage-guided fuzzers target solving predicates in
conditional statements to increase branch coverage. Con-
ditional statements determine which branch the program
will take according to the input value. Nested conditional
statements exist when the reachability of one conditional
statement depends on the outcome of a previous one that
shares common input bytes. Ideally, predicates in condi-
tional statements do not share common input bytes, thus
solving each one independently would be sufficient.
However, real-world programs often contain a multitude
of conditional statements which have both control flow
and data flow dependencies. Therefore, solving predicates
independently would fail to work on nested conditional
statements, because attempting to solve the inner conditional
statement could trigger an alternate branch, resulting in the
current targeted conditional statement becoming unreach-
able.
2.3. Current Limitations
Current state-of-the-art greybox fuzzers are unable to
reliably and efficiently solve nested conditional statements.
Fuzzers using heuristics or principled mutation methods
such as AFL and Angora do not have enough information
about control flow and data flow dependencies between
conditional statements to devise an input that can satisfy
all relevant path constraints. Other fuzzers utilizing hybrid
concolic execution such as Driller experience performance
hits due to concretizing entire symbolic constraints of a
path [40, 41]. QSYM is a practical concolic execution
fuzzer, but it is tailored to solve only the last constraint
on a path, thus facing the same challenge of solving nested
conditional statements.
Using Angora as an example, we evaluated the impact of
nested conditional statements on Angora’s performance and
analyzed the constraints in eight programs that Angora failed
to solve in Table 2, where each constraint corresponds to a
unique branch in the program. The second column shows
what percentage of the unsolved constraints are nested,
which depend on other conditional statements by control
flow and data flow (Section 3.4). The third column shows
what percentage of all the constraints, both solved and
unsolved, are nested. Table 2 shows that the majority of
the unsolved constraints are nested, ranging from 57.95% to
nearly 100%. It also shows that nested constraints account
for a substantial portion of all the constraints, ranging from
44.14% to 89.50%. These results suggest that solving nested
constraints could improve the capability of greybox fuzzers
substantially.
3. Design
3.1. Problem
State-of-the-art coverage-guided fuzzers, e.g., An-
gora [13], QSYM [40], VUzzer [30] and REDQUEEN [4],
explore branches by solving path constraints, which typi-
cally involves the following steps. First, identify the input
byte offsets that affect each conditional statement using dy-
namic taint analysis or similar techniques. Then, determine
TABLE 2: Percentage of nested constraints
Program Percentage of nested constraints in
all unsolved constraints all constraints
file 86.49 % 44.14 %
jhead 57.95 % 51.53 %
xmlwf 96.18 % 68.16 %
djpeg 90.00 % 75.65 %
readpng 94.02 % 89.50 %
nm 84.32 % 68.16 %
objdump 90.54 % 73.95 %
size 87.86 % 71.46 %
readelf 84.12 % 70.50 %
mutool 80.88 % 58.63 %
tcpdump 96.15 % 78.98 %
tiff2ps 75.56 % 62.18 %
xmlint 78.18 % 72.37 %
how the input bytes should be mutated, such as calculating
the gradient of the predicate and using gradient descent,
matching magic bytes or resorting to using a symbolic exe-
cution solver. Finally, execute the program with the mutated
input and verify if this triggers the other branch in the
conditional statement.
Although this approach is effective in solving many path
constraints, it fails when the target conditional statement
becomes unreachable during input mutation.
Figure 2 shows an example. Let the variables x, y, and
z contain different input byte offsets. Let the current input
execute the false branch of Line 8. Let the goal be to explore
the true branch of Line 8. Therefore, the fuzzer determines,
by dynamic byte-level taint analysis, that it needs to change
the byte offsets in y. Consider two different initial values of
x and y.
1) x = 0 and y = 1. If the fuzzer mutates y to 3, then the
program will no longer reach Line 8 because Line 3
will take a different (false) branch. This renders the
fuzzer helpless when solving the branch predicate, even
though a satisfying assignment y = 2 exists.
2) x = 1 and y = 1. In this case, no value of y can
satisfy the true branches of Line 2, Line 3, and Line 8
simultaneously, unless we also mutate x. However,
since x does not flow into the conditional statement
on Line 8, the fuzzer does not know that it should
mutate x, so it can never find a satisfying assignment
to explore the true branch of Line 8, regardless of the
algorithm used to solve the constraint.
The example above shows that to execute an unexplored
branch, it is sometimes inadequate to mutate only the input
byte offsets that flow into the conditional statement because
doing so might render this statement unreachable. A naive
solution could resort to mutating all the input byte offsets,
but that would increase the search space by many magni-
tudes, which would make this approach too expensive to be
practical.
3.2. Solution overview
To overcome the problem in Section 3.1, our key insight
is that when we fuzz a conditional statement, we must find
an input that both satisfies the path constraint and keeps
the statement reachable. Most fuzzers that explore branches
by solving path constraints consider only the satisfiability
criterion but fail to consider the reachability criterion. We
propose the following steps to satisfy both criteria while
mutating the input. Let s be the target conditional statement.
We have an initial input on which the program runs through
s. Our goal is to mutate the input to let s take a different
branch (we will say that the new input satisfies s).
1) Determine control flow dependencies among condi-
tional statements. Identify all the conditional statements
before s on the trace that may make s unreachable. For
example, if s is on Line 8 in Figure 2, then if any of
the conditional statements on Line 2, 3, and 4 takes a
different branch, then Line 8 will be unreachable. We
call these the prior conditional statements of s, which s
depends by control flow. By contrast, no matter which
branch Line 5 takes, Line 8 will always be reachable.
Section 3.3 will describe this step in detail.
2) Determine data flow dependency among conditional
statements. Among the prior conditional statements of
s, identify those whose corresponding input byte offsets
may have to be mutated to satisfy s. For example, let s
be Line 8 in Figure 2. Among its three prior conditional
statements, only those on Line 2 and 3 contain byte
offsets (x and y) that may have to be mutated to satisfy
s. We call these effective prior conditional statements,
which s depends on by data flow. By contrast, Line 4
contains no input byte offsets that may have to be
mutated to satisfy s. Section 3.4 will describe this step
in detail.
3) Solve constraints. Mutate the byte offsets in the ef-
fective prior conditional statements to satisfy s. Sec-
tion 3.5 will describe this step in detail.
3.3. Determine control flow dependency among
conditional statements
For each conditional statement s, we wish to identify all
its prior conditional statements, which are the conditional
statements that, if taking a different branch, may cause
s to be unreachable. Let the immediate prior conditional
statement of s on a trace be the last prior conditional
statement of s, i.e., there is no prior conditional statement
of s between r and s. Note that if s is prior conditional
statement of t, and t is of u, then s is a prior conditional
statement of u. This allows us to find all the prior conditional
statements of s transitively: starting from s, we repeatedly
find the immediate prior conditional statement, and then take
the union of all such statements.
We propose two different methods for finding the imme-
diate prior statement that is in the same function and that is
in a different function, respectively. In our implementation
for optimization, we cached all the found dependencies to
avoid repeated computing.
3.3.1. Intraprocedural immediate prior conditional
statement. Starting from a conditional statement s, we
walk back on the trace. When we find the first conditional
statement r
• that is in the same function, and
• that s does not post-dominate [1]
then r is the immediate prior statement of s. Our im-
plementation used the post-dominator trees produced by
LLVM [24].
If we cannot find such r, then s has no intraproce-
dural immediate prior conditional statement, and we will
search for its interprocedural immediate prior conditional
statement, to be described in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.2. Interprocedural immediate prior conditional
statement. It would be straightforward to use interproce-
dural post-dominator trees for efficient handling, but unfor-
tunately, LLVM does not provide such information, so we
designed the following method for finding the interprocedu-
ral immediate prior conditional statement of s. Starting from
s, we walk back on the trace to find the first conditional
statement r that satisfies all the following:
1) r is in a different function than s, and
2) r’s frame is still on the stack when s is executing, and
3) Let rc be the last call instruction that r’s frame exe-
cuted. rc must exist because r is in a deeper stack frame
than t. If rc does not post-dominate r (note that r and rc
are in the same function), then r is the interprocedural
immediate prior statement of s.
3.3.3. Irregular interprocedural control flow. Apart from
function calls, the program could also exhibit irregular in-
terprocedural control flows, for instance including EXIT and
LONGJMP instructions. If a conditional statement r has at
least one branch that leads to a basic block which contains
irregular flows, then we consider it to be the prior condi-
tional statement of all the statements after itself even when
its frame is not on the stack. If s is a conditional statement
after r, we add r and r’s prior conditional statements to the
set of s’s prior conditional statements. In LLVM, the basic
blocks containing irregular interprocedural control flows are
terminated with UNREACHABLE instruction.
3.4. Determine data dependency among conditional
statements
For each conditional statement s, Section 3.3 finds all
its prior conditional statements p(s). Let b(s) be the set
of byte offsets that flow into s where s is one or more
conditional statements. When we mutate the input, as long
as no conditional statement in p(s) takes a different branch,
s is guaranteed to be reachable. This seems to suggest that
we should avoid mutating any byte offset in b(p(s)).
On the other hand, avoid mutating every byte offset in
b(p(s)) may prevent the fuzzer from finding a satisfying
assignment for s, as discussed in Section 3.1. Take Figure 2
as an example. Let s be Line 8. Using Section 3.3.1, we
determine that p(s) consists of Lines 2, 3, and 4. Therefore,
b(p(s)) = {x, y, z}. If we keep all the byte offsets in b(p(s))
immutable, then we are left with no byte offset to mutate
when trying to find an input to satisfy s.
The problem arises because Section 3.3 considers only
control flow dependency among conditional statements, but
it fails to consider whether data flow dependencies exist
between the conditional statements. We define the effective
prior conditional statements of s, e(s), to be a subset of the
prior conditional statements of s, where to find an input to
satisfy s, we may have to mutate some byte offsets flowing
into a statement in e(s). In other words, if a prior conditional
statement r of s is not also an effective prior conditional
statement of s, then no byte offset flowing into r needs to
be mutated to satisfy s. This means that we may consider
only the effective prior conditional statements and ignore
the non-effective prior conditional statements.
Algorithm 1 shows the algorithm for computing effective
prior conditional statements, which relies on the following
property: if r is an effective prior conditional statement of
s, and q is a prior conditional statement of s and q and r
share common input byte offsets, then q is also an effective
prior conditional statement of s.
Some conditionl statements are determined by a long
sequence of input bytes, such as those in checksums. If
we take the union of their input byte offsets, almost all
the conditionl statements will be data dependent. Thus, we
should only check if they have share common input bytes
with s.
Algorithm 1 Find effective prior conditional statements
1: function FINDEFFECTIVEPRIORCONDSTMT(s, stmts)
. s: conditional statement being fuzzed; stmts: prior
conditional statements of s. Returns: effective prior
conditional statements of s
2: Initialize a union-find data structure.
3: for all stmt ∈ stmts do
4: T ← input byte offsets flowing into stmt.
5: UNION all t ∈ T .
6: end for
7: O ← ∅
8: bs ← any one byte offset flowing into s
9: for all stmt ∈ stmts do
10: b← any one byte offset flowing into stmt
11: if FIND(bs) == FIND(b) then
12: O ← O ∪ {stmt}
13: end if
14: end for
15: return O
16: end function
3.5. Solve constraints
Section 3.4 determines the effective prior conditional
statements for each conditional statement s. On the one
hand, if we freely mutate the byte offsets flowing into any
of them, s may become unreachable. But on the other hand,
we may be required to mutate some of those byte offsets
to satisfy the unexplored branch of s. Therefore we need to
determine which of those statements whose relevant input
byte offsets we may mutate. We propose three alternative
strategies.
1) Prioritize reachability
2) Prioritize satisfiability
3) Joint optimization for both reachability and satisfiabil-
ity
Matryoshka focuses on solving nested conditional state-
ments. It uses the three strategies to in this order: prioritize
reachability, prioritize satisfiability, and joint optimization.
We limit the time for trying each strategy to ensure its
efficiency. If there exists no effective prior conditional
statements of s, Matryoshka uses general approaches from
Angora or other fuzzers to solve the path constraint directly.
Therefore, Matryoshka exhibits better performance in solv-
ing nested conditional statements while having the same
ability as other fuzzers to solve constraints without effective
prior conditional statements.
3.5.1. Prioritize reachability. This strategy pessimistically
assumes that if we mutate any byte offset that flows into any
effective prior conditional statements of a conditional state-
ment s, s may become unreachable. Therefore, this strategy
ensures that s is always reachable by avoiding mutating
any byte offset that flows into any of s’s effective prior
conditional statements. Formally, let b(s) be the byte offsets
flowing into s, and b(e(s)) be the byte offsets flowing into
s’s effective prior conditional statements. Angora mutates
all the byte offsets in b(s), which may cause s to become
unreachable. By contrast, this strategy of Matryoshka mu-
tates only the byte offsets in b(s) \ b(e(s)), i.e. all the byte
offsets that flow into s but that do not flow into any effective
prior statement of s.
Take the program in Figure 2 for example. When we fuzz
s on Line 3, its only effective conditional statement is t on
Line 2. b(s) = {x, y}. b(e(s)) = {x}. Using this strategy,
the fuzzer mutates only the byte offsets in b(s) \ b(e(s)) =
{y}.
However, this strategy fails when we fuzz s on Line 8.
In this case, its effective prior statements consist of the
statements on Line 2 and 3, so b(s) = {y}, b(e(s)) = {x, y},
but b(s)\b(dp(s)) = ∅. Using this strategy, Matryoshka will
fail to fuzz s because it finds no byte offset to mutate.
3.5.2. Prioritize satisfiability. This strategy optimistically
hopes that a mutated input that satisfies a conditional state-
ment s can also reach s. It has a forward phase followed
by a backtrack phase. During the forward phase, it mutates
the byte offsets flowing into s while artificially keeping
the branch choices of all the effective prior conditional
Algorithm 2 Find a satisfying input while prioritizing sat-
isfiability
1: function FINDINPUT(s, stmts) . s:
the target conditional statement. stmts: effective prior
conditional statements of s.
2: . Forward phase
3: While keeping the branch choice of each r ∈ stmts,
find an input i that satisfies the target branch of s.
4: Run the program on i.
5: if s’s target branch is reachable then
6: return Success
7: end if
8: . Backtracking phase
9: BI ← ∅ . Input byte offsets not to be mutated.
10: for stmt ∈ stmts in the reverse order on the trace
do
11: B ← input byte offsets flowing into stmt
12: B2 ← B \BI
13: While keeping the branch choice of all r ∈
stmts where r appears before stmt on the trace, find
an input i that satisfies the target branch of stmt, during
which only the input byte offsets in B2 may be mutated.
14: Run the program on i.
15: if stmt’s target branch is reachable then
16: return Success
17: end if
18: BI ← BI ∪B
19: end for
20: return Failure
21: end function
statements of s, thereby guaranteeing that s is always reach-
able. If it finds an input that satisfies the target branch
of s, it runs the program on that input normally (without
artificially fixing branch choices). If this trace still reaches
s and chooses the target branch, it succeeds. Otherwise,
it enters the backtrack phase. During this phase, it starts
from s and then goes backward to fuzz each of the effective
prior statements of s in that order. When it fuzzes one such
statement r, it avoids mutating any byte offset that may flow
into s or any effective prior conditional statement of s that is
after r. The process succeeds when the fuzzer successfully
fuzzes all of these effective prior conditional statements.
Algorithm 2 shows this algorithm.
Take the program in Figure 2 as an example. When we
fuzz s on Line 8, its effective prior conditional statements
are on Line 3 and 2. Let the current input be x = 1, y = 1.
Under this input, both Line 2 and 3 take the true branch, and
Line 8 takes the false branch. Our goal is to take the true
branch on Line 8. Using this strategy, during the forward
phase, the fuzzer mutates y while artificially forcing the
program to take the true branch on both Line 2 and 3. If the
fuzzer finds an assignment y = 2 to satisfy the true branch
of Line 8, but since x = 1, y = 2 does not satisfy Line 3, it
enters the backtracking phase. During this phase, it will first
fuzz Line 3. Although this line is affected by two byte offsets
{x, y}, since y flows into Line 8, the fuzzer will mutate x
TABLE 3: Transform a comparison into a function. For
example, the first row transforms a < b to a − b + . 
is the smallest positive value of the type for a and b. For
integers,  = 1.
Comparison f()
a < b a− b+ 
a <= b a− b
a > b b− a+ 
a >= b b− a
a == b abs(a− b)
a! = b −abs(a− b) + 
only. If it finds a satisfying assignment x = 0, it tries to run
the program with x = 0, y = 2 without artificially forcing
branch choices. Since this input reaches Line 3 and satisfies
the target (true) branch, fuzzing succeeds.
By contrast, let us assume that the fuzzer finds a satis-
fying assignment y = 3 when fuzzing Line 8. During the
backtrack phase, when fuzzing Line 3, since it can mutate
only x, it cannot find a satisfying assignment. Therefore,
fuzzing of s fails.
3.5.3. Joint optimization for both reachability and satis-
fiability. Both strategies in Section 3.5.1 and Section 3.5.2
search for a solution to one constraint at a time. Section 3.5.1
mutates only the input byte offsets that will not make the
target conditional statement unreachable, while Section 3.5.2
tries to satisfy the target conditional statement and its effec-
tive prior conditional statements one at a time. However,
they fail to find a solution where we must jointly optimize
multiple constraints.
Let s be the target conditional statement. Let fi(x) ≤
0,∀i ∈ [1, n] represent the constraints of the effective
prior conditional statements of s, and fo(x) ≤ 0 represent
the constraint of s. x is a vector representing the input
byte offsets. Table 3 shows how to transform each type of
comparison to f ≤ 0. Our goal is to find an x that satisfies
all fi(x) ≤ 0, i ∈ [0, n]. Note that each fi(x) is a blackbox
function representing the computation on the input x by the
expression in the conditional statement i. Since the analytic
form of fi(x) is unavailable, many common optimization
techniques, such as Lagrange multiplier, do not apply.
We propose a solution to the optimization problem.
Define
g(x) =
n∑
i=0
R(fi(x))
where the rectifier R(x) ≡ max(0, x). When g(x) = 0, we
are guaranteed that fi(x) = 0,∀i ∈ [0, n]. In other words,
we combined the n+1 optimizations into one optimization.
Now we can use the gradient descent algorithm, similar to
the one used by Angora, to find a solution to g(x) = 0.
Note that when we compute the gradient of g(x) using dif-
ferentiation, we need to artificially keep the branch choices
of the effective prior conditional statements of s to ensure
that s is reachable.
1 void bar(int y, int z) {
2 int k = 0;
3 int n = 0;
4 if (z - y == 56789) {
5 k = 1;
6 n = 1;
7 }
8 if (k == 1) {
9 if (z == 123456789) {
10 ....
11 }
12 }
13 }
14
15 void foo(int x, int y, int z) {
16 void (*fun_ptr)(int, int) = NULL;
17 if (z - x == 12345) {
18 fun_ptr = &bar;
19 } else {
20 fun_ptr = &other_fn;
21 }
22 (*fun_prt)(y, z);
23 }
Figure 3: A program showing implicit control and data flow
dependencies
3.6. Detect implicit effective prior conditional state-
ments
The success of the mutation strategies in Section 3.5
depends on our finding of all the control flow and data flow
dependencies among conditional statements. Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4 described algorithms for finding all the explicit
control flow and data flow dependencies, respectively. How-
ever, they are unable to find implicit flows. Figure 3 shows
such an example. The conditional statement on Line 17
causes an implicit data flow into fun_ptr in function foo,
which then implicitly determines the control flow whether
the program will call the function bar or other_fn.
Also, Line 4 causes an implicit data flow into the variable
k, whose value will determine the value of the predicate
on Line 8. Therefore, both the conditional statements on
Line 17 and Line 4 should be effective prior conditional
statements for the target statement on Line 9. However, since
the data flow is implicit, the algorithms in Section 3.4 cannot
find them.
Implicit data flows may be identified using control flow
graphs [23]. If a predicate is tainted, then the method taints
all the variables that get new values in either branch of
the conditional statement. For byte-level taint tracking, this
method adds the taint label of the predicate to each of
the above variables. For example, consider the predicate on
Line 4 in Figure 3. Since the variables k and n are assigned
new values in a branch of this conditional statement, this
method adds the taint label of the predicate (i.e., the taint
label of the variable y) to the variable k and n. However,
this method often results in over taint or taint explosion,
because it may add taint labels that will be useless to the
analysis. For example, in the example above, while the taint
label added to the variable k captures the implicit data flow
dependency from Line 4 to Line 8, the taint label added to
the variable n is useless because it does not help identify
new data flow dependencies between conditional statements.
Even worse, these useless taint labels will propagate further
to other parts of the program, resulting in taint explosion.
We propose a novel approach to identify implicit con-
trol flow and data flow dependencies between conditional
statements without incurring either huge analysis overhead
or taint explosion. The insight is that rather than identifying
all the implicit flows, we need to identify only those that
cause the target conditional statement to become unreach-
able during input mutation. Let s be the target conditional
statement that was reachable on the original input but be-
came unreachable on the mutated input. We run the program
twice. First, we run the program on the original input and
record the branch choices of all the conditional statements
on the path before s. Then, we run the program on the
mutated input with a special handling: when we encounter a
conditional statement, we record its branch choice but force
it to take the branch choice as in the previous run (on the
original input). Therefore, the paths of the two runs have the
same sequence of conditional statements. We examine all
the conditional statements on the path from the start of the
program to s in the reverse chronological order. For each
such statement t, if it is not already an explicit effective
prior statement identified by the algorithms in Section 3.4
and if its branch choices in the first run (on the original
input) and the second run (on the mutated input) differ, it
has a potential control flow or data flow dependency with
s. To test whether this dependency truly exists, we run the
program on the mutated input with a special handling: we
force all the following conditional statements to take the
branch choice as in the first run:
1) all the conditional statements before t on the path
2) all the explicit effective prior conditional statements
3) all the implicit effective prior conditional statements
If the program no longer reaches s, then t truly has
implicit control flow or data flow dependency with s, and we
mark it as an implicit effective prior conditional statement
of s.
The complexity of this algorithm is linear relative to the
number of conditional statements before s that are affected
by the mutated bytes but are not control-flow-wise depen-
dent with s. However, since Matryoshka mutates inputs by
gradient descent on a small proportion of the input, the
number of statements we should test is likely to be few.
4. Implementation
We implemented Matryoshka in 8672 lines of Rust,
and 1262 lines of C++ for LLVM pass. We bor-
rowed from Angora the code for byte-level taint track-
ing and for mutating the input by gradient descent [3].
When computing intraprocedural post dominator trees
(Section 3.3), Matryoshka uses LLVM’s function pass
PostDominatorTreeWrapperPass [24].
5. Evaluation
We evaluated Matryoshka in three parts. In the first part,
we compared Matryoshka with nine other fuzzers on the
LAVA-M data set [14]. Next, we compared Matryoshka with
three other most representative fuzzers on 13 open source
programs. Finally, we evaluated how Matryoshka’s ability
to solve nested constraints contributes to its impressive
performance.
We ran our experiments on a server with two Intel Xeon
Gold 5118 processors and 256 GB memory running 64-bit
Debian 10.5 Even though Matryoshka can fuzz a program
using multiple cores simultaneously, we configured it to
fuzz the programs using only one core during evaluation.
We ran each experiment five times and reported the average
performance.
5.1. Comparison on LAVA-M
LAVA-M consists of four programs with a large number
of injected but realistic looking bugs [14]. It has been widely
used for evaluating fuzzers. However, it is approaching the
end of its shelf life as the state of the art fuzzers (Angora
and REDQUEEN) were able to find almost all the injected
bugs in LAVA-M. While we cannot use LAVA-M to show
that Matryoshka advances the state of the art, we can use it
to show that Matryoshka is at the state of the art.
Table 4 compares the number of bugs found by 10
fuzzers. Matryoshka and REDQUEEN are the best: they
both found almost all the listed bugs in LAVA-M.6
5.2. Comparison on 13 open source programs
We compared Matryoshka with AFL, QSYM and An-
gora by line and branch coverage and unique crashes found.
We ran them on 13 open source programs shown in Table 6.
Eight of the programs were used for evaluating Angora, and
the rest were used frequently for evaluating other fuzzers.
5.2.1. Program coverage and efficiency. We compared
line and branch coverage of AFL(1 Master + 1 Slave),
Angora(+1 AFL Slave), QSYM(+ 1 AFL Slave) and Ma-
tryoshka (+1 AFL Slave). Table 5 shows the coverage after
running AFL, Angora, QSYM and Matryoshka on two CPU
cores for 24 hours (one core for AFL slave). Matryoshka
outperformed AFL, QSYM, and Angora on all the programs,
except on xmlwf , mutool, and tiff2ps where Matryoshka had
similar performance with Angora. Matryoshka’s advantage
shines the most on xmllint, where Matryoshka increased line
and branch coverage by 18.6% and 24.3%, respectively, over
Angora, the fuzzer with the next highest coverage.
Figure 4 compares the cumulative line and branch cov-
erage by AFL, Angora, and Matryoshka on the program
5. Matryoshka does not need that much amount of memory. We also
successfully fuzzed all the programs on our laptop with only 8 GB memory.
6. Matryoshka and REDQUEEN also found several unlisted bugs, which
the LAVA-M authors injected but were unable to trigger. Table 11 shows
the IDs of unlisted bugs.
TABLE 4: Bugs found on the LAVA-M data set by different fuzzers.
Program Listed Bugs found by each fuzzer
bugs Matryoshka Angora QSYM NEUZZ REDQUEEN AFL FUZZER SES VUzzer Steelix
uniq 28 29 29 28 29 29 9 7 0 27 7
base64 44 48 48 44 48 48 0 7 9 17 43
md5sum 57 57 57 57 60 57 0 2 0 Fail 28
who 2136 2432 1541 1238 1582 2462 1 0 18 50 194
TABLE 5: Comparison of coverage between AFL, Angora, QSYM and Matryoshka
Program Line coverage Branch coverage
AFL QSYM Angora Matryoshka AFL QSYM Angora Matryoshka
file 2650 3098 3186 3277 1752 2073 2163 2286
jhead 399 761 903 978 218 445 538 583
xmlwf 4916 4732 5018 5019 1995 1920 2042 2041
djpeg 5926 5994 5934 6108 1901 1940 1890 2106
readpng 1657 2047 2032 2188 912 1156 1166 1278
nm 4434 6002 6034 6749 2567 3314 3414 3745
objdump 3912 6380 7813 8104 2298 3402 4196 4332
size 3339 4960 5305 5445 1945 2685 2893 2965
readelf 7584 8357 10 128 11 219 5654 6131 7172 7900
mutool 5232 5557 5687 5676 2164 2430 2547 2529
tcpdump 12 953 12 485 13 691 13 992 7443 7025 8004 8210
tiff2ps 5202 4892 5299 5287 3246 3048 3328 3292
xmllint 6025 6221 6392 7580 5117 5334 5635 7006
readpng over time. Matryoshka covered more lines and
branches than QSYM and Angora at all time, thanks to its
ability to solve nested conditional statements.
5.2.2. Unique crashes and vulnerabilities analysis. Be-
sides all the inputs that crashed the program during fuzzing,
we also ran AddressSanitizer(ASAN) [31] on all the seeds
found by each fuzzer and saved the inputs where ASAN
reported errors. Then, we deduplicated the crashes by AFL’s
afl-cmin -C command. Table 1 shows that Matryoshka
found significantly more crashes than all the other fuzzers.
Matryoshka found more crashes than Angora, the next best
fuzzer, on file (15 vs. 6), jhead (758 vs. 574), objdump (99
vs. 4), size (10 vs. 0), readelf (261 vs. 77), and tiff2ps (144
vs. 66).
5.2.3. Manual bug verification and classification. We
manually verified all the crashes and classified them into
unique bugs shown in Table 7. Matryoshka found a total
of 41 unique bugs in seven programs (it found no bugs in
the rest six programs). We have reported all the bugs to the
developers and 12 of them have been assigned CVE IDs.
5.3. Novel features of Matryoshka
We evaluated the key novel feature of Matryoshka:
its ability to solve constraints involving nested conditional
statements.
5.3.1. Solved constraints. On each program and given the
same seeds, the constraints that Matryoshka can solve is
TABLE 6: Programs used in evaluation in Section 5.2
Program Version Argument Size
file commit-6367a7c9b4 740KB
jhead 3.03 201KB
xmlwf(expat) commit-9f5bfc8d0a 800KB
djpeg(ijg) v9c 800KB
readpng(libpng) commit-0a882b5787 981KB
nm(binutils) commit-388a192d73 -C 6.2MB
objdump(binutils) commit-388a192d73 -x 8.6MB
size(binutils) commit-388a192d73 6.1MB
readelf(binutils) commit-388a192d73 -a 1.9MB
mutool(mupdf) commit-08657851b6 draw 39MB
tcpdump(libpacp) commit-e9439e9b71 -nr 5.0MB
tiff2ps(libtiff) commit-a0e273fdca 2.7MB
xmllint(libxml2) commit-d3de757825 6.4MB
a superset of the constraints that Angora can solve. This
is because for each constraint, Matryoshka will first try to
solve it using Angora’s method. If it fails, then Matryoshka
will start to use the methods in Section 3. We evaluated
which constraints unsolved by Angora could be solved by
Matryoshka. To eliminate the impact of randomness on the
fuzzers, we collected inputs generated by AFL and fed
them as the only seeds to both Angora and Matryoshka.
In other words, we discarded the new seeds generated by
Angora and Matryoshka during fuzzing, respectively. We
ran Matryoshka using three different mutation strategies de-
scribed in Section 3.5 for five hours: prioritize reachability
(Section 3.5.1), prioritize satisfiability (Section 3.5.2), and
joint optimization (Section 3.5.3).
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Figure 4: Cumulative line and branch coverage on readpng by AFL, Angora, and Matryoshka in 24 hours
TABLE 7: Classification of verified bugs found by Ma-
tryoshka. SBO: stack buffer overflow; HBO: heap buffer
overflow; OOM: out of memory; OBR: out of bound read.
Program Number of bugsSBO HBO OOM OBR Total
file 4 4
jhead 2 15 6 23
nm 1 1 2
objdump 3 1 4
size 1 1 2
readelf 4 4
tiff2ps 1 1 2
Table 8 shows the number of constraints that Matryoshka
could solve but Angora could not. The table shows that
Matryoshka could solve as few as 172 and as many as 1794
new constraints (that were unsolvable by Angora) per pro-
gram. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the algorithms
in Section 3. Table 9 compares Matryoshka’s three strategies
for solving constraints described in Section 3.5. The strategy
prioritizing satisfiabily was the most effective, but there were
constraints that this strategy could not solve but others could.
The strategy prioritizing reachability was effective on jhead
and size, and the joint optimization strategy was effective on
readpng. For speed, the strategy prioritizing reachability is
the fastest, and the joint optimization strategy is the slowest.
Since there is no clear winner between the strategies, our
prototype implementation applies them in the order of their
speed.
Figure 1 shows an example where Angora could not
reach the false branch of Line 6 but Matryoshka could. This
is because when Angora mutated buffer[0] to satisfy
the false branch of Line 6, it caused the CRC check on
Line 4 to fail, so the function never reached Line 6. Using
the strategy for prioritizing satisfiability, Matryoshka first
found an assignment to buffer[0], either 1 or 2, to reach
the false branch of Line 6. Then, it backtracked to the prior
conditional statement on Line 4. Through byte-level taint
analysis, Matryoshka learned that all the input bytes flowed
into Line 4, but since buffer[0] also flowed into Line 6,
this strategy directed Matryoshka to keep buffer[0] fixed
but to freely mutate all the bytes. Using gradient descent,
Matryoshka found an input that satisfied the false branch of
Line 4.7
5.3.2. Effective prior conditional statements. A key in-
sight that allows Matryoshka to solve nested constraints
effectively is that it identifies effective prior conditional
statements, whose branch choices may cause the target
conditional statement to become unreachable, and solves
a constraint that consists of only those statements, instead
of all the prior conditional statements on the path as done
in traditional symbolic execution. Table 10 compares the
average number of effective prior conditional statements vs
all prior conditional statements. It shows that the effective
prior conditional statements account for a very small fraction
of all the prior conditional statements (less than 5% on 11
programs, and less than 10% on all the 13 programs). This
fact significantly reduces the complexity of the path con-
straints that Matryoshka solves and increases the likehood
that the constraints can be solved.
6. Discussions
Table 8 shows that Matryoshka solved many constraints
that Angora could not solve, but still unsolved constraints
remain. We analyze why Matryoshka could not solve them.
6.1. Unsatisfiable constraints
Some constraints are unsatisfiable. Figure 5
shows an example in readpng. The program
7. The reason why gradient descent helped Matryoshka to find a solution
on Line 4 is that the CRC value itself was in the input. Therefore, gradient
descent found that the objective function had a constant partial derivative
with regard to the input byte offsets containing the CRC value, so it directed
Matryoshka to mutate those byte offsets to reduce the objective function
to zero.
TABLE 8: Constraints unsolved by Angora but solved by Matryoshka
Program
Constraints unsolved Constraints solved % of solved
by Angora by Matryoshka nested constraints
All Nested Nested
file 610 527 172 32.6 %
jhead 4923 2853 316 11.1 %
xmlwf 5233 5033 301 6.0 %
djpeg 1889 1700 345 20.3 %
readpng 5353 5033 1170 23.2 %
nm 2564 2162 408 18.9 %
objdump 4418 4000 377 9.4 %
size 4359 3830 593 15.5 %
readelf 4012 3375 621 18.4 %
mutool 1883 1523 249 16.3 %
tcpdump 4343 4079 1794 44.0 %
tiff2ps 8923 6564 330 5.0 %
xmllint 1838 1437 271 18.9 %
TABLE 9: Constraints solved by prioritizing reachabil-
ity (PR, Section 3.5.1), prioritizing satisfiability (PS, Sec-
tion 3.5.2), and joint optimization (JO, Section 3.5.3).
Program Constraints solved by strategyPR PS JO
file 5 163 11
jhead 172 243 60
xmlwf 1 253 97
djpeg 1 305 72
readpng 0 1043 313
nm 30 321 78
objdump 47 343 53
size 231 414 56
readelf 2 573 86
mutool 1 247 12
tcpdump 20 1742 59
tiff2ps 10 323 16
xmllint 1 252 31
calls png_check_chunk_name before calling
png_format_buffer. png_check_chunk_name
checks if the character is alphanumerical on Line 7. If not,
it exits with an error. But later png_format_buffer
checks the character again on on Line 20, so the false
branch of this line is unsatisfiable.
6.2. Taint lost in propagation
Section 3.4 uses the results from byte-level taint tracking
to determine the data dependency between nested condi-
tional statements. Similar to Angora, Matryoshka also ex-
tended DFSan [27] to implement byte-level taint tracking,
but none of them can track taint flow through external
libraries. We manually modeled the taint flow in common
external libraries for Matryoshka, but this is in no way
comprehensive.
TABLE 10: Comparison of the average number of effective
prior conditional statements and all prior conditional state-
ments.
Program Effective All Effective/All
file 22.27 345.25 6.5 %
jhead 16.81 2425.00 0.7 %
xmlwf 5.88 655.31 0.9 %
djpeg 21.69 1217.98 1.8 %
readpng 21.18 859.02 2.5 %
nm 27.93 842.54 3.3 %
objdump 23.93 493.24 4.9 %
size 21.72 469.46 4.6 %
readelf 7.23 2498.21 0.3 %
mutool 20.08 2087.80 1.0 %
tcpdump 26.26 268.52 9.8 %
tiff2ps 30.44 1747.16 1.7 %
xmllint 11.80 502.39 2.3 %
6.3. Program crashing when applying the strategy
for prioritizing satisfiability and joint optimization
When mutating the input using the strategy for prior-
itizing satisfiability (Section 3.5.2) and joint optimization
(Section 3.5.3), Matryoshka artificially keeps the branch
choices of prior conditional statements. This may cause the
program to crash. For example, a conditional statement may
serve to prevent the program from accessing data out of
bound. If we mutate the length of the data but artificially
keep the branch choice of the conditional statement, the
program may access data out of bound and crash.
6.4. Difficult joint constraint
The joint optimization strategy is the last resort for
mutation. We examined the conditional statements that have
at least one effective prior conditional statement in the
program tiff2ps and found that they have on average 30 such
prior statements in Table 10. It is difficult to solve such a
complex joint constraint.
1 // pngrutilc.c
2 void
3 png_check_chunk_name(png_const_structrp png_ptr,
4 const png_uint_32 chunk_name) {
5 for (i=1; i<=4; ++i) {
6 if (c < 65 || c > 122 ||
7 (c > 90 && c < 97))
8 png_chunk_error(png_ptr,
9 "invalid chunk type");
10 ...
11 }
12 ..
13 }
14 // pngerror.c 445
15 void
16 png_format_buffer(png_const_structrp png_ptr,
17 png_charp buffer,
18 png_const_charp error_message) {
19 ...
20 if (isnonalpha(c) != 0) {
21 }
22 }
23 ...
Figure 5: An example with an unsatisfiable constraint. The
false branch on Line 20 is unsatisfiable because it is pre-
cluded by the check on Line 7.
7. Related work
7.1. Solving complicated constraints
State-of-the-art fuzzers increase program coverage by
attempting to reach both branches of each conditional state-
ment. However, they usually do not solve constraints directly
due to performance, complexity and neccesity reasons. For
example, Angora uses gradient descent to solve constraints
efficiently, but it has difficulties in solving constraints for
nested conditional statements [13].
Symbolic execution has the potential to solve complex
constraints [8, 11] and is used in fuzzing [18, 19, 10, 26,
4, 34, 28, 37, 40]. A major example would be Driller,
which uses symbolic execution only when the co-running
AFL cannot progress due to complicated constrains [34].
Steelix [26] and REDQUEEN [4] detects magic bytes check-
ing and infer their input offsets to solve them without
taint analysis. T-Fuzz ignores input checks in the original
program and leverages symbolic execution to filter false
positives and reproduce true bugs [28]. TaintScopre fixs
checksum values in the generated inputs using symbolic
execution [37]. In T-Fuzz and TaintScope, input checks
and checksum checks are complex constraints. However,
symbolic execution faces the challenges of path explosion
and scalability [9, 33]. QSYM uses fast concolic execution
to overcome the scalability problem, but similar to Angora, it
solves only the constraint of the target conditional statement
without considering any nesting relationships between other
conditional statements [40]. By contrast, Matryoshka finds
all those nesting conditional statements and searches for an
input that satisfies all of them.
7.2. Using control flow information to guide fuzzing
Run-time control flow information contains various indi-
cators useful for guiding fuzzing [30, 28, 37, 13, 25, 6, 12,
39, 16]. VUzzer uses control flow information to prioritize
inputs that may explore deep code blocks but that do not
lead to error handling codes [30]. Angora prioritizes fuzzing
on unexplored branches [13]. AFLGo and Hawkeye measure
the distance between the seed input and the target location
in the control flow graph, and minimizes the distance in
fuzzing [6, 12]. T-Fuzz [28] and TaintScope [37] use control
flow features to find sanity checks and checksum checks,
respectively. After that, they remove these checks to cover
more code.
FairFuzz identifies the “rare branches” exercised by few
inputs using control flow information and schedules the
fuzzer to generate inputs targeting the “rare branches” [25].
If a path constraint does not exhibit data flow dependencies
on the “rare branches”, FairFuzz can solve them efficiently
similar to QSYM and Angora. Otherwise, the input bytes
flowing into the path constraint will not be included in
the mutation mask, e.g. nested conditional statements, and
FairFuzz will experience difficulties while solving it.
Post dominator trees [1] were used to determine control
flow dependencies [15]. Xin et al.[38] proposed a method
to capture both intraprocedural and interprocedural control
dependencies efficiently based on post-dominator trees. The
method inserts code at the point before each conditional
statement(BRANCHING) and the head of its post dominator
block(MERGE). Similarly, Matryoshka proposes an equiva-
lent approach without the injections at the MERGE, which is
more efficient in our case of finding all the prior conditional
statements.
SYMFUZZ [10] uses control dependencies to infer input
bit dependencies and use it to find an optimal mutation ratio
for fuzzing. Under this method, nested conditional state-
ments will introduce more complex input bit dependencies.
SYMFUZZ utilizes this information to reduce mutation ratio
for fuzzing, which is incapable of solving nested conditional
statements efficiently.
7.3. Using taint tracking to guide fuzzing
Taint tracking can locate which input bytes flow into
the security-sensitive code that may trigger bugs [17, 5,
21]. VUzzer [30] is an application-aware fuzzer that uses
taint analysis to locate the position of “magic bytes” in
input files and assigns these “magic bytes” to fixed po-
sitions in the input. VUzzer can find “magic bytes” only
when they appear continuously in the input. TIFF [22]
is an improvement over VUzzer, using in-memory data
structure identification techniques and taint analysis to infer
input types. Angora [13] tracks the flow of input bytes
into conditional statements and mutates only those bytes.
Matryoshka uses the same technique to identify relevant
bytes in the input. Taintscope [37] uses taint tracking to
infer checksum-handling code and bypasses these checks
using control flow alteration since these checks are hard
to satisfy when mutating the input. T-Fuzz [28] detects
complex checks without taint tracking. Both approaches use
symbolic execution to generate valid input that would solve
target constraints. Checksum-handling code is an classic
example of nesting conditional statements: the code that
uses the value is nested under the conditional statement that
verifies the checksum. Matryoshka is able to handle such
code naturally.
DTA++[23] allows dynamic taint analysis to avoid
under-tainting when implicit flows occur in data transforma-
tions. It locates culprit implicit flows that cause the under-
tainting through binary search and generates rules to add
additional taint for those control dependencies only. How-
ever, the method may result in over-tainting. Matryoshka
proposes an efficient aproach that can avoid over-tainting
when determining data-flow dependencies among condi-
tional statements.
7.4. Using machine learning to guide fuzzing
Machine learning and its techniques found their way in
fuzzing. Both Angora and Matryoshka view solving con-
straints as a search problem and take advantage of com-
monly used search algorithms in machine learning. Sky-
fire [36] learns a probabilistic context-sensitive grammar
(PCSG) from existing samples and leverages the learned
grammar to generate seed inputs. Learn & Fuzz [20] first
attempts to use a neural network to automatically generate
an input grammar from sample inputs. Instead of learning a
grammar, Rajal et al. use neural networks to learn a function
to predict the promising input bytes in a seed file to perform
mutations [29]. Konstantin et al. formalizes fuzzing as a re-
inforcement learning problem using the concept of Markov
decision processes and constructs an algorithm based on
deep Q-learning that chooses high reward actions given
an input seed [7]. NEUZZ [32] uses a surrogate neural
network to smoothly approximate a target programâA˘Z´s
branch behavior and then generates new input by gradient-
guided techniques uncover new branches.
8. Conclusion
For coverage-based fuzzers, the most important ability
is to explore deeply nested branches because they are dif-
ficult to reach by test cases. Even though recent fuzzers
made impressive progress, they still have difficulty reaching
deep branches. We designed and implemented Matryoshka,
a tool for fuzzing deeply nested conditional statements.
We proposed algorithms for identifying nesting conditional
statements that the target branch depends on by control flow
and data flow, and proposed three strategies for mutating
the input. Our evaluation shows that Matryoshka found
significantly more unique crashes than AFL, QSYM, and
Angora, and those crashes represent 41 unique new bugs in
13 open source programs.
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Appendix
TABLE 11: IDs of bugs injected but unlisted by LAVA, because the LAVA authors were unable to trigger them when
preparing the data set. Matryoshka found these bugs.
Program IDs of bugs unlisted by LAVA-M but found by Matryoshka
uniq 227
base64 274, 521, 526, 527
md5sum -
who 2, 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 73, 77, 81, 85, 89, 117, 125, 165, 169, 173, 177, 181, 185, 189, 193,
197, 210, 214, 218, 222, 226, 294, 298, 303, 307, 312, 316, 321, 325, 327, 334, 336, 338, 346, 350, 355, 359, 450,
454, 459, 463, 468, 472, 477, 481, 483, 488, 492, 497, 501, 504, 506, 512, 514, 522, 526, 531, 535, 974, 975, 994,
995, 996, 1007, 1026, 1034, 1038, 1049, 1054, 1071, 1072, 1329, 1334, 1339, 1345, 1350, 1355, 1361, 1377, 1382,
1388, 1393, 1397, 1403, 1408, 1415, 1420, 1429, 1436, 1445, 1450, 1456, 1461, 1718, 1727, 1728, 1735, 1736,
1737, 1738, 1747, 1748, 1755, 1756, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1903, 1904, 1911, 1912, 1921, 1925, 1935, 1936,
1943, 1944, 1949, 1953, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2019, 2023, 2027, 2031, 2034, 2035,
2039, 2043, 2047, 2051, 2055, 2061, 2065, 2069, 2073, 2077, 2079, 2081, 2083, 2085, 2147, 2181, 2189, 2194,
2198, 2219, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2225, 2229, 2231, 2235, 2236, 2240, 2244, 2246, 2247, 2249, 2253, 2255, 2258,
2262, 2266, 2268, 2269, 2271, 2275, 2282, 2286, 2291, 2295, 2302, 2304, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467,
2468, 2469, 2499, 2500, 2507, 2508, 2521, 2522, 2529, 2681, 2682, 2703, 2704, 2723, 2724, 2742, 2790, 2796,
2804, 2806, 2810, 2814, 2818, 2823, 2827, 2834, 2838, 2843, 2847, 2854, 2856, 2915, 2916, 2917, 2918, 2919,
2920, 2921, 2922, 2974, 2975, 2982, 2983, 2994, 2995, 3002, 3003, 3013, 3021, 3082, 3083, 3099, 3185, 3186,
3187, 3188, 3189, 3190, 3191, 3192, 3198, 3202, 3209, 3213, 3218, 3222, 3232, 3233, 3235, 3237, 3238, 3239,
3242, 3245, 3247, 3249, 3252, 3256, 3257, 3260, 3264, 3265, 3267, 3269, 3389, 3439, 3443, 3464, 3465, 3466,
3467, 3468, 3469, 3470, 3471, 3487, 3488, 3495, 3496, 3509, 3510, 3517, 3518, 3523, 3527, 3545, 3551, 3561,
3939, 4224, 4287, 4295
